Games may be represented in many different ways, and different representations of games affect the complexity of problems associated with games, such as finding a Nash equilibrium. The traditional method of representing a game is to explicitly list all the payoffs, but this incurs an exponential blowup as the number of agents grows.
INTRODUCTION
A central topic at the interface of computer science and economics is understanding the complexity of computational problems involving equilibria in games. While these types of questions are already interesting (and often difficult) for standard two-player games presented in "bimatrix form" [16, 3, 9, 15] , many of the current motivations for such games come from settings where there are many players (e.g. the Internet) or many strategies (e.g. combinatorial auctions). In n-player games and in games with many strategies, the representation of the game becomes an important issue. In particular, explicitly describing an n-player game in which each player has only two strategies requires an exponentially long representation (consisting of N = n · 2 n payoff values). Thus the complexity of this problem is more natural for games given by some type of concise representation, such as the graph games recently proposed by Kearns, Littman, and Singh [14] .
Motivated by the above considerations, we undertake a systematic study of the complexity of Nash equilibria in games given by concise representations. We focus on two types of concise representations. The first are circuit games, where the game is specified by a boolean circuit computing the payoffs. Circuit games were previously studied in the setting of two-player zero-sum games, where computing (resp., approximating) the "value" of such a game is shown to be EXP-complete [7] (resp., S2P-complete [8] ). They are a very general model, capturing essentially any representation in which the payoffs are efficiently computable. The second are graph games [14] , where the game is presented by a graph whose nodes are the players and the payoffs of each player are a function only of the strategies played by each player's neighbor. (Thus, if the graph is of low degree, the payoff functions can be written very compactly). Kearns et al. showed that if the graph is a tree and each player has only two strategies, then approximate Nash equilibria can be found in polynomial time. Gotlobb, Greco, and Scarcello [12] recently showed that the problem of deciding if a degree-4 graph game has a pure-Nash equilibrium is NP-complete.
In these two models (circuit games and graph games), we study 4 problems: 1. IsNash: Given a game G and a randomized strategy profile θ, determine if θ is a Nash equilibrium in G, 2. ExistsPureNash: Given a game G, determine if G has a pure (i.e. deterministic) Nash equilibrium, 3 . FindNash: Given a game G, find a Nash equilibrium in G, and 4. GuaranteeNash: Given a game G, determine whether G has a Nash equilibrium that achieves certain payoff guarantees for each player. (This problem was previously studied by [9, 3] , who showed it to be NPcomplete for two-player, bimatrix games.)
We study the above four problems in both circuit games and graphical games, in games where each player has only two possible strategies and in games where the strategy space is unbounded, in n-player games and in 2-player games, and with respect to approximate Nash equilibria for different levels of approximation (exponentially small error, polynomially small error, and constant error). Our results include:
• A tight characterization of the complexity of all of the problems listed above except for FindNash, by showing them to be complete for various complexity classes. This applies to all of their variants (w.r.t. concise representation, number of players, and level of approximation). For the various forms of FindNash, we give upper and lower bounds that are within one nondeterministic quantifier of each other.
• A general result showing that n-player circuit games in which each player has 2 strategies are a harder class of games than standard two-player bimatrix games (and more generally, than the graphical games of [14] ), in that there is a general reduction from the latter to the former which applies to most of the problems listed above.
Independent/Subsequent Results. Several researchers have
independently obtained some results related to ours. Specifically, Daskalakis and Papadimitriou [5] give complexity results on concisely represented graphical games where the graph can be exponentially large (whereas we always consider the graph to be given explicitly), and Alvarez, Gabarro, and Serna [AGS05] give results on ExistsPureNash that are very similar to ours. In addition, there have been several important related results subsequent to the original versions of our work [20, 19] . In particular, Goldberg and Papadimitriou [10] give a reduction from degree-d graph games to d 2 -player normalform games.
1 Their reduction uses a technique similar to one in the original version of this paper [19] . Furthermore, [10] gives a reduction from d-player games to degree-3 boolean graph games, strengthening our second bullet above. Each of these reductions creates a natural map between Nash equilibrium. By composing these reductions, they show that for any constant C, the problem of finding a Nash equilibrium in a game with at most C players, referred to as C-Nash, can be reduced to the case where C = 4, 4-Nash. 1 A normal-form game is one where the payoffs are explicitly specified for each possible combination player strategies. Subsequently, with Daskalakis [4] , they prove that for C ≥ 4 C-Nash is complete for the class PPAD [16] . Daskalakis and Papadimitriou [6] and Chen and Deng [1] independently prove the same result holds for C = 3. Chen and Deng [2] have now proved the same result holds even for C = 2.
Organization. We define game theoretic terminology and fix a representation of strategy profiles in Section 2. Section 3 contains formal definitions of the concise representations and problems that we study. Section 4 looks at relationships between these representations. Sections 5 through 8 contain the main complexity results on IsNash, ExistsPureNash, FindNash, and GuaranteeNash.
Due to space constraints, many proof are omitted. A pure strategy for an agent i is an element of si. A mixed strategy θi, or simply a strategy, for a player i is a random variable whose range is si. The set of all strategies for player i will be denoted Θi. A strategy profile is a sequence θ = (θ1, . . . , θn), where θi is a strategy for agent i. We will denote the set of all strategy profiles Θ.
BACKGROUND AND CONVENTIONS
A pure-strategy profile is a strategy profile in which each agent plays some pure-strategy with probability 1. A k-uniform strategy profile is a strategy profile where each agent randomizes uniformly between k, not necessarily unique, pure strategies.
The support of a strategy (or of a strategy profile) is the set of all pure-strategies (or of all pure-strategy profiles) played with nonzero probability. We define a function Ri : Θ × Θi → Θ that replaces the ith strategy in a strategy profile θ by a different strategy for agent i, so Ri(θ, θ i ) = (θ1, . . . , θ i , . . . , θn). This diverges from conventional notation which writes (θ−i, θ i ) instead of Ri(θ, θ i ).
Given a strategy profile θ, we say agent i is in equilibrium if he cannot increase his expected payoff by playing some other strategy (giving what the other n − 1 agents are playing). Formally agent i is in equilibrium if νi(θ) ≥ νi(Ri(θ, θ i )) for all θ i ∈ Θi. Because Ri(θ, θ i ) is a distribution over Ri(θ, si) where si ∈ si and νi acts linearly on these distributions, Ri(θ, θ i ) will be maximized by playing some optimal si ∈ si with probability 1. Therefore, it suffices to check that νi(θ) ≥ νi(Ri(θ, si)) for all si ∈ si. For the same reason, agent i is in equilibrium if and only if each strat-egy in the support of θi is an optimal response. A strategy profile θ is a Nash equilibrium [17] if all the players are in equilibrium. Given a strategy profile θ, we say player i is
A strategy profile θ is an -Nash equilibrium if all the players are in -equilibrium. A pure-strategy Nash equilibrium (respectively, a pure-strategy -Nash equilibrium) is a purestrategy profile which is a Nash equilibrium (respectively, an -Nash equilibrium).
A two-player is called a zero-sum game if ν1(s) = −ν2(s)
for all s ∈ s. Each zero-sum game G has a game value ν(G)
Pennies is a 2-player game where s1 = s2 = {0, 1}, and ν1(s1, s2) = 1 if s1 = s2 and 0 otherwise. ν2(s1, s2) = 1 if s1 = s2 and 0 otherwise. Pennies has a unique Nash equilibrium where both agents randomize uniformly between their two strategies. In any -Nash equilibrium of 2-player pennies, each player randomizes between each strategy with probability
+ the positive instances, and L − the negative instances. An algorithm decides a promise-language if it accepts all the positive instances and rejects all the negative instances. Nothing is required of the algorithm if it is run on instances outside L + ∪ L − . Because we consider approximation problems in this paper, which are naturally formulated as promise languages, all complexity classes used in this paper are classes of promise languages. We refer the reader to the recent survey of Goldreich [11] for about the usefulness and subtleties of working with promise problems. Figure 1 shows the relationships between the complexity classes used in this paper. If a line connects two complexity classes in the figure, it indicates that the class lower on the page is contained in the complexity class higher on the page. EXP and NEXP are the classes of languages that can be decided in exponential time and nondeterministic exponential time, respectively. Both of these classes are provably not equal to P. #P is the class of NP counting functions. Functions in these class answer how many accepting computations a nondeterministic polynomial-time Turing machine has (rather than if one accepting computation exists, like NP). While #P contains NP, #P is generally thought to also contain much harder problems than NP. BPP is the class of languages that can be computed with by a randomized algorithm with two-sided error in polynomial time. BPP is generally considered a class of tractable problems. P, called quasipolynomial time, contains languages that can be deterministically decided in time 2 poly(log(|x|)) on input x.P, usually considered nearly tractable, clearly contains P and is contained by EXP. A promise language L is in S2P if there exists a polynomial time computable and polynomially bounded relation R ⊂ Σ * × Σ * × Σ * such that:
If C and D are two complexity classes then the complexity class C D is the set of languages that can be decided in C augmented by oracle access to any particular language in D. For example, a language is in Σ2P = NP NP if it can be decided by a nondeterministic polynomial-time Turning machine with oracle access to SAT.
A search problem, is specified by a relation
where given an x ∈ Σ * we want to either compute y ∈ Σ * such that (x, y) ∈ R or say that no such y exists. When using a search problem as an oracle, it is required that any valid response from the oracle yields a correct answer.
CONCISE REPRESENTATIONS AND PROBLEMS STUDIED
We now give formal descriptions of the problems which we are studying. First we define the two different representations of games. 
can ever influence the payoff of agent j. This definition was proposed in [14] . We change their definition slightly by using directed graphs instead of undirected ones (this only changes the constant degree bounds claimed in our results).
Note that any game (with rational payoffs) can be represented as a circuit game or a graph game. However, a degree-d graph game can only represent games where no one agent is influenced directly by the strategies of more than d other agents.
A circuit game can encode the games where each player has exponentially many pure-strategies in a polynomial amount of space. In addition, unlike in an explicit representation, there is no exponential blow-up as the number of agents increases. A degree-d graph game, where d is constant, also avoids the exponential blow-up as the number of agents increases. For this reason we are interested mostly in boundeddegree graph games.
We study two restrictions of games. In the first restriction, we restrict a game to having only two players. In the second restriction, we restrict each agent to having only two strategies. We will refer to games that abide by the former restriction as 2-player, and to games that abide by the latter restriction as boolean.
If we want to find a Nash equilibrium, we need an agreed upon manner in which to encode the result, which is a strategy profile. We represent a strategy profile by enumerating, by agent, each pure strategy in that agent's support and the probability with which the pure strategy is played. Each probability is given as the quotient of two integers.
This representation works well in bimatrix games, because the following proposition guarantees that for any 2-player game there exists Nash equilibrium that can be encoded in reasonable amount of space.
Proposition 3.3. Any 2-player game with rational payoffs has a rational Nash equilibrium where the probabilities are of bit length polynomial with respect to the number of strategies and bit-lengths of the payoffs. Furthermore, if we restrict ourselves to Nash equilibria θ where νi(θ) ≥ gi for i ∈ {1, 2} where each guarantee gi is a rational number then either 1) there exists such a θ where the probabilities are of bit length polynomial with respect to the number of strategies and bit-lengths of the payoffs and the bit lengths of the guarantees or 2) no such θ exists.
This proposition implies that for any bimatrix game there exists a Nash equilibrium that is at most polynomially sized with respect to the encoding of the game, and that for any 2-player circuit game there exists a Nash equilibrium that is at most exponentially sized with respect to the encoding of the game.
However, there exist 3-player games with rational payoffs that have no Nash equilibrium with all rational probabilities [18] . Therefore, we cannot hope to always find a Nash equilibrium in this representation. Instead we will study -Nash equilibrium when we are not restricted to 2-player games. The following result from [15] states that there is always an -Nash equilibrium that can be represented in a reasonable amount of space. 
Recall that a k-uniform strategy profile is a strategy profile where each agent randomizes uniformly between k, not necessarily unique, pure strategies. The number of bits needed to represent such a strategy profile is O(( È i min{k, |si|})· log k). Thus, Theorem 3.4 implies that for any that for any n-player game (g1, . . . , gn) = (s, ν) in which all the payoffs are between 0 and 1, there exists an -Nash equilibrium of bit-length poly(n, 1/ , log(maxi |si|)). There also is an -Nash equilibrium of bit-length poly(n, log(1/ ), maxi |si|).
We want to study the problems with and without approximation. All the problems that we study will take as an input a parameter related to the bound of approximation. We define four types of approximation: 1a) Exact: Fix = 0 in the definition of the problem. With all problems, we will look at only 3 types of approximation. Either 1a) or 1b) and both 2 and 3. With many of the problems we study, approximating using 1a) and 1b) yields identical problems. Since the notion of -Nash equilibrium is with respect to additive error, the above notions of approximation refer only to games whose payoffs are between 0 and 1 (or are scaled to be such). Therefore we assume that all games have payoffs which are between 0 and 1 unless otherwise explicitly stated. Many times our constructions of games use payoffs which are not between 0 and 1 for ease of presentation. In such a cases the payoffs can be scaled. Now we define the problems which we will examine.
Definition 3.5. For a fixed representation of games, IsNash is the promise language defined as follows:
Positive instances: (G, θ, ) such that G is a game given in the specified representation, and θ is strategy profile which is a Nash equilibrium for G.
Negative instances: (G, θ, ) such that θ is a strategy profile for G which is not an -Nash equilibrium.
Notice that when = 0 this is just the language of pairs (G, θ) where θ is a Nash equilibrium of G.
The the definition of IsNash is only one of several natural variations. Fortunately, the manner in which it is defined does not affect our results and any reasonable definition will suffice. For example, we could instead define IsNash where:
1. (G, θ, ) a positive instance if θ is an /2-Nash equilibrium of G; negative instances as before.
(G, θ, , δ)
is a positive instance if θ is an -Nash equilibrium; (G, θ, , δ) is a negative instance if θ is not an + δ-Nash equilibrium. δ is represented in the same way as .
Similar modifications can be made to Definitions 3.6, 3.7, and 3.9. The only result affected is the reduction in Corollary 4.5.Definition 3.6. We define the promise language IsPureNash to be the same as IsNash except we require that, in both positive and negative instances, θ is a pure-strategy profile.
Definition 3.7. For a fixed representation of games, ExistsPureNash is the promise language defined as follows:
Positive instances: Pairs (G, ) such that G is a game in the specified representation in which there exists a pure-strategy Nash equilibrium.
Negative instances: (G, ) such that there is no purestrategy -Nash equilibrium in G.
Note that Exact ExistsPureNash is just a language consisting of pairs of games with pure-strategy Nash equilibria.
Definition 3.8. For a given a representation of games, the problem FindNash is a search problem where, given a pair (G, ) such that G is a game in a specified representation, a valid solution is any strategy-profile that is an -Nash equilibrium in G.
As remarked above, when dealing with FindNash in games with more than 2 players, we use Exp-Approx rather than Exact. This error ensures the existence of some Nash equilibrium in our representation of strategy profiles; there may be no rational Nash equilibrium.
Definition 3.9. For a fixed representation of games, GuaranteeNash is the promise language defined as follows:
Positive instances: (G, , (g1, . . . , gn) ) such that G is a game in the specified representation in which there exists a Nash equilibrium θ such that, for every agent i, νi(θ) ≥ gi.
Negative instances: (G, , (g1, . . . , gn) ) such that G is a game in the specified representation in which there exist no -Nash equilibrium θ such that, for every agent
When we consider IsNash, FindNash, and GuaranteeNash in k-player games, k > 2, we will not consider Exact, but only the other three types: Exp-Approx, Poly-Approx, and Const-Approx. The reason for this is that no rational Nash equilibrium is guaranteed to exist in these cases, and so we want to allow a small rounding error.
With all other problems we will not consider Exp-Approx, but only the remaining three: Exact, Poly-Approx, and Const-Approx.
RELATIONS BETWEEN CONCISE GAMES
We study two different concise representations of games: circuit games and degree-d graph games; and two restrictions: two-player games and boolean-strategy games. It does not make since to impose both of these restrictions at the same time, because in two-player, boolean games all the problems studied are trivial.
This leaves us with three variations of circuit games: circuit games, 2-player circuit games, and boolean circuit games. Figure 2 shows the hierarchy of circuit games. A line drawn between two types of games indicates that the game type higher in the diagram is at least as hard as the game type lower in the diagram in that we can efficiently reduce questions about Nash equilibria in the games of the lower type to ones in games of the higher type. (One caveat is that for 2-player circuit games we consider
It is easy to see that given a bimatrix game, we can always efficiently construct an equivalent 2-player circuit game. It is also possible to construct a log space reduction from graph games of arbitrary degree to boolean circuit games, a result which we will state presently in Theorem 4.1 and its corollaries. This gives us the relationship in Figure 2 . 1. f and g map pure-strategy profiles to pure-strategy profiles.
f and g map rational strategy profiles to rational strategy profiles.
3. g • f is the identity map.
For each agent i in G there an agent i in G such that for any strategy profile θ of G, νi(θ) = ν i (f (θ)) and for any strategy profile θ of G , ν i (θ ) = νi(g(θ )).

If θ is an -Nash equilibrium in G then g(θ )
is a log 2 k · -Nash equilibrium in G where k = maxi |si|.
6.
• For every θ ∈ Θ, θ is a Nash equilibrium if and only if f (θ) is a Nash equilibrium. 4 More formally, we specify f and g by constructing, in space O(log(|G|)), a branching program for f and a circuit that computes g.
• For every pure-strategy profile θ ∈ Θ, θ is anNash equilibrium if and only if f (θ) is and -Nash equilibrium.
Proof Sketch:
We briefly sketch the mapping of G to G . Given a graph game G, to construct G , we create a binary tree ti of depth log |si| for each agent i, with the elements of si at the leaves of the tree. Each internal node in ti represents an agent in G . The strategy space of each of these agents is {left, right}, each corresponding to the choice of a subtree under his node.
The strategy of each agent in ti "points" to another agent or strategy (the root of the right or left subtree) further down in the tree ti. By following the paths induced by these points, each node in the tree ti can be associated with some leaf at the bottom of the tree ti and, therefore, with some strategy si ∈ si from the game G. Let s be such that sj is the strategy associated with the agent at the root of tj . Then we define the payoff of an agent i in ti to be ν i = νi (Ri(s, s i ) The new results in [10] change things slightly. This result gives a polynomial-time reduction from Exact and ExpApprox FindNash in degree-d graph games to degree-3 boolean graph games as long as d is constant.
ISNASH AND ISPURENASH
In this section, we study the problem of determining whether a given strategy profile is a Nash equilibrium. Studying this problem will also help in studying the complexity of other problems.
IsNash
A summary of the results for IsNash is shown in Figure 3 . The various complexity classes are described in Section 2 under the heading of Complexity Theory.
Notice that with Poly-Approx and Const-Approx everything works much as with Exp-Approx and Exact, but #P, counting, is replaced by BPP, approximate counting.
IsNash is in P for all graph games. When allowing arbitrarily many players in a boolean circuit game, IsNash becomes P #P -complete (via Cook reductions). When allowing exponentially many strategies in a 2-player circuit game, it becomes coNP-complete. IsNash for a generic circuit game combines the hardness of these 2 cases and is coNP #P -complete. In the previous proof, we obtain the hardness result by making one player choose between many different strategies, and thus making him assert something about the evaluation of each strategy. We will continue to use similar tricks except that we will often have to be more clever to get many strategies. Randomness provides one way of doing this. Proof Sketch: We show here that it is P #P -hard. We reduce from MajoritySat, which is P #P -complete under Cook reductions. A circuit C belongs to MajoritySat if it evaluates to 1 on at least half of its inputs.
Given a circuit C with n inputs (without loss of generality, n is even), we construct an (n + 1)-player boolean circuit game. The payoff to agent 1 if he plays 0 is Even if we allow just one agent in a boolean circuit game to have arbitrarily many strategies, then the problem becomes coNP #P -complete. We now look at the problem when dealing with PolyApprox and Const-Approx.
Theorem 5.5. With Poly-Approx and Const-Approx, boolean circuit game IsNash is BPP-complete. 5 Furthermore, this holds for any approximation error < 1.
Proof Sketch: Boolean circuit game IsNash with polynomially small approximation is in BPP because given an instance (G, θ, ), for each agent i and each strategy si ∈ {0, 1} we can use random sampling to distinguish the following two possibilities in probabilistic polynomial time: whether νi(θ) ≥ νi(Ri(θ, si)) or νi(θ) + < νi (Ri(θ, si) ).
The hardness result is very similar to the proof in Theorem 5.3. The key difference is that here we reduce from the BPP-complete promise language of deciding if a given a circuit C accepts fewer than 1/3 or more than 2/3 of its inputs.
2 Theorem 5.6. With Poly-Approx and Const-Approx, circuit game IsNash is coNP BPP = coMA-complete. Furthermore, this holds for any approximation error < 1.
Note that when approximating IsNash, it never made a difference whether we approximated by a polynomially small amount or by any constant amount less than 1.
IsPureNash
In this section we will study a similar problem: IsPureNash. In the case of non-boolean circuit games, IsPureNash is coNP-complete. With the other games examined, IsPureNash is in P. 
EXISTENCE OF PURE-STRATEGY NASH EQUILIBRIA
We now will use the previous relationships to study the complexity of ExistsPureNash. Figure 4 gives a summary of the results. The hardness of these problems is directly related to the hardness of IsPureNash. We can always solve ExistsPureNash with one more non-deterministic alternation because we can nondeterministically guess a pure-strategy Nash equilibrium, and then check that it is correct. Recall that in the case of non-boolean circuit games, IsPureNash is coNPcomplete. With the other games examined, IsPureNash is in P (but is only proven to be P-hard in the case of boolean circuit games; see Subsection 5.2). As shown in Figure 4 , with the exception of bimatrix games, this strategy of nondeterministically guessing and then checking is the best that one can do.
We first note that ExistsPureNash is an exceedingly easy problem in the bimatrix case because we can enumerate over all the possible pure-strategy profiles and check whether they are Nash equilibria.
ExistsPureNash is interesting because it is a language related to the Nash equilibrium of bimatrix games that is not NP-complete. One particular approach to the complexity of finding a Nash equilibrium is to turn the problem into a language. Both [9] and [3] show that just about any reasonable language that one can create involving Nash equilibrium in bimatrix games is NP-complete; however, ExistsPureNash is a notable exception. Our results show that this phenomenon does not extend to concisely represented games.
Theorem 6.1. Circuit game ExistsPureNash and 2-player circuit game ExistsPureNash are Σ2P-complete with any of the defined notions of approximation. Furthermore, it remains hard as long as approximation error < 1.
For graph games, it was recently shown by Gottlob, Greco, and Scarcello [12] that ExistsPureNash is NP-complete, even restricted to graphs of degree 4. Below we strengthen their result by showing this also holds for boolean graph games, for graphs of degree 3, and for any approximation error < 1. 
Proof Sketch:
Here, to show the hardness result, we reduce from CircuitSat which is NP-complete. Given a circuit C (without loss of generality every gate in C has total degree ≤ 3; we allow unary gates), we design the following game: For each input of C and for each gate in C, we create player with the strategy space {true, false}. We call these the input agents and gate agents respectively, and call the agent associated with the output gate the judge. We also create two additional agents P1 and P2 with strategy space {0, 1}.
We now define the payoffs. Each input agent is rewarded 1 regardless. Each gate agent is rewarded 1 for correctly computing the value of his gate and is rewarded 0 otherwise. If the judge plays true then the payoffs to P1 and P2 are always 1. If the judge plays false then the payoffs to P1 and P2 are the same as the game pennies-P1 acting as the first player, P2 as the second.
It is now straightforward to check that a pure strategy Nash equilibria exists if and only if C is satisfiable.
2
The first thing to notice is that like IsPureNash this problem does not become easier with approximation, even if we allow as much approximation as possible without the problem becoming trivial. Also, similarly to IsPureNash, any reasonable definition of approximation would yield the same results.
FINDING NASH EQUILIBRIA
Perhaps the most well-studied of these problems is the complexity of finding a Nash equilibria in a game. In the bimatrix case FindNash is known to be P-hard but unlikely to be NP-hard. There is something elusive in categorizing the complexity of finding something we know is there. Such problems, including finding Nash equilibrium, are studied by [16] .
Recently, [15] showed that if we allow constant error, the bimatrix case FindNash is in quasipolynomial time (i.e.P). The results are summarized in Figure 5 . Poly-Approx and Const-Approx
Figure 5: Summary of FindNash Results
In all types of games, there remains a gap of knowledge of less than one alternation. This comes about because to find a Nash equilibrium we can simply guess a strategy profile and then check whether it is a Nash equilibrium. It turns out that in all the types of games, the hardness of FindNash is at least as hard as IsNash (although we do not have a generic reduction between the two). Circuit game and 2-player circuit game Poly-Approx and Const-Approx FindNash are the only cases where the gap in knowledge is less than one alternation. Subsequent to our work, it was shown in [4] that, in graph game and boolean graph games, Exact and Exp-Approx FindNash are complete for the class PPAD. Also, subsequent to our work, it was shown in [2] that the same is true for bimatrix games.
In a circuit game, there may be exponentially many strategies in the support of a Nash equilibrium or the bit length of the probability that a particular strategy is played may be exponentially large. In either case, it would take exponentially long just to write down a Nash equilibrium. In order to avoid this problem, when we are not assured the existence of a polynomially sized Nash equilibrium (or -Nash equilibrium), we will prove hardness results not with FindNash, but with FindNashSimple. FindNashSimple is an easier promise language version of FindNash that always has a short answer. Positive instances: (G, i, si, k, ) such that G is a game given in the specified representation, and in everyNash equilibrium θ of G,
Negative instances: (G, i, si, k, ) such that G is a game given in the specified representation, and in everyNash equilibrium θ of G, Pr[θi = si] < k.
FindNashSimple is easier than FindNash in that a FindNash algorithm can be used to obtain FindNashSimple algorithm of similar complexity, but the converse is not clear. 
Proof Sketch:
We show here that circuit game ExpApprox FindNashSimple is EXP-hard. We reduce from SuccinctCircuitValue. Given a succinctly represented circuit C, we construct an instance of FindNashSimple based upon a 6-player game G = (s, ν).
Let G be the set of gates in C and let N = |G|. We create 3 computing agents: c1, c2, and c3; and we create 3 enforcing agents: e1, e2, and e3. Each computing agent has the strategy set sc i = {g,ḡ : g ∈ G}. Each enforcing agent has the strategy set se i = {g : g ∈ G}. The payoffs are designed so that in any -Nash equilibrium the enforcing agent ei forces the computing agent ci to play g orḡ (for each g ∈ G) with probability at least 1/N − . In addition, the payoff of computing agent ci is designed so that, if the other two computing agents play strategies associated to the input gates of the gate associated with the strategy of ci, agent ci is penalized for playing the incorrect output of the gate (using the strategies of the other computing agents as inputs).
We can then show inductively that in any -Nash equilibrium θ, no agent ci plays a strategy corresponding to the incorrect evaluation of a gate with probability greater than 2 .
Given this, we can solve an instance of SuccinctCircuitValue on an instance C by querying FindNashSimple on the instance (G, c1, o, 2 , ) , where o is the output gate, and returning the same answer. 2
A technique similar to this proof was used in [10] to show a reduction from degree-d graph games to d 2 player normal form games. The basic idea is as follows, given a degree-d graph game G, color the vertices of the graph corresponding to G so that no vertex has two neighbors of the same color (this requires at most d 2 colors). Now create a computing agent and an enforcing agent for each color. Similar to the above construction, each enforcing agent forces the corresponding computing agent to nearly uniformly randomize between the strategies spaces of each player associated with his color in the graph game.
Circuit game FindNash become easier when we approximate. The main reason is that now, by Theorem 3.4, there always exists a Nash equilibrium with a polynomially sized support. Thus we can guess an -Nash equilibrium and, using a result like IsNash, test that it is such. Unlike the exponential case, here the complexity is at most one alternation more than the complexity of the corresponding IsNash problem. This hardness result, as well as that of Theorem 7.2, is based on a reduction to GameValue, which is known to be EXP-complete [7] to compute exactly and S2P-complete to approximate. The next two hardness results use a different general approach, the hardness of IsNash.
Unlike ExistsPureNash, FindNash is a lot harder in boolean circuit games than in graph games. This is because of the hardness of IsNash in boolean circuit games. Proof. It is in NP #P because there always exists a polynomial length solution, and by Theorem 5.3 we can verify a solution in #P. The hardness result is very similar to that of Theorem 5.3. Given a circuit C with n inputs, we build a similar n + 1 player game that offers agent 1 a choice of payment of
n+1 or the output of the circuit. For sufficiently small , if the circuit evaluates to true a majority of the time, agent 1 must choose the output of the circuit with high probability.
In the previous result, the hardness comes from the hardness of IsNash, so it is not surprising that boolean circuit game FindNash becomes easier when we introduce approximation. 
It is in NP BPP because there exists a solution with a polynomial length description, and by Theorem 5.5 the validity of any solution can be check in BPP.
We create the same game as in the reduction of Theorem 5.5, but with two differences: First, instead of creating |r|-players (where r is the randomness required) that play pennies against each other, we create 2k · |r| such players for some polynomially large k that we will specify later. Secondly, when we calculate the payoff to the first player for choosing the circuit, we obtain an input to the circuit by taking XORs of the bits played by |r| disjoint subsets of the remaining players, of size k each. Now because the 2k · |r| remaining players must play a -Nash equilibrium, they must randomize over their inputs so that they play 0 with probability ∈ [1/2 − 2 , 1/2 + 2 ]. The bits from the strategies of these players are fully independent, so by XORing we get a string of |r| bits that is exponentially close to uniform.
The payoff to agent 1 for playing ∅ is 1 2 , but the payoff for choosing the circuit will by exponentially close to the probability that a random input satisfies the circuit.
Finally, we show the complexity for graph games. 
EXISTENCE OF NASH EQUILIBRIA WITH GUARANTEED PROPERTIES
Because FindNash is a search problem where a solution is guaranteed to exist, it is hard to define a nontrivial language from it. It is possible to create languages from FindNash by adding additional constraints on the equilibrium. For example: does there exists a Nash equilibrium where each player is paid at least x amount? does there exists a Nash equilibrium with social welfare x? or does there exists a Nash equilibrium in which player 1 does not play some strategy s1? It turns out that in the bimatrix case, for almost any constraint the language ends up being NPcomplete [3, 9] . 6 GuaranteeNash is one such a problem. In our results, each GuaranteeNash problem is complete for the class that was the upper bound for the same instance of FindNash. Figure 6 shows a summary of the results. This result relies heavily on proof techniques of [3] . It follows from their proof that Exact GuaranteeNash is NP-complete in bimatrix games. We observe that the result scales up exponentially and also holds even for Exp-Approx in this case.
2. ν1((x, y1), (x, y2) , γ = 1 10 , and gi = 1 − γ. It is relatively straightforward to check that (C, k1, k2) ∈ QCircuitSat if and only if there exists a Nash equilibrium that meets the guarantees.
We now argue that Circuit game Poly-Approx GuaranteeNash is in Σ2P. First note that Σ2P BPP = Σ2P because coNP BPP = coMA ⊆ Σ2P. Thus an ∃ coNP BPPpredicate can be replaced by an ∃ Σ2P-predicate = Σ2P-predicate. Now the result follows because we can guess such an equilibrium and check, in coNP BPP , that it is a Nash equilibrium and meets the guarantees. Conitzer and Sandholm [3] showed that Exact GuaranteeNash is NP-complete in bimatrix games. We observe that the same holds even for Poly-Approx: Proof. Given an instance (G, , (g1, . . . , gn)) simply look through all the k-uniform strategies, where k = 4 log(4 max i |s i |) 2 for a strategy profile that is an -Nash equilibrium where the payoffs to players are within /2 of their guarantees. There are only a quasipolynomial number of k-uniform strategies and checking each strategy takes only polynomial time. If such a strategy is found, accept, otherwise reject.
If there is no -Nash equilibrium within of the guarantees, surely the algorithm will not find one. However, if there exists some Nash equilibrium θ that pays off each player his guaranteed amount, then by Theorem 3.4 there will exist a k-uniform -Nash equilibrium θ that is within /2 of the guarantees, and so the algorithm will find it.
